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"BETWEEN MINIMAL COURAGE AND
MAXIMUM COWARDICE": A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF THE RELEASE OF
ABU DAOUD*
Sandra E. Rapoport**
INTRODUCTION
Whereas, By means of an untruthful and invalid legal ex-
cuse, the French government refused to recognize a perfectly
proper request of the Israeli government for the extradition of
Daoud . . . now, therefore, be it Resolved by this legislative
body of the State of New York, That the President and the
Congress of the United States advise the French government
that the faith and prayers and hopes and beliefs and principles
of the free peoples of the world are far more important to the
American people and its government than French profits at the
expense of innocent lives . ...
These words express moral outrage at the release of Abu
Daoud. International relations, however, are governed by legality
as well as morality. France, by releasing Abu Daoud, has violated
not only conventional and customary international law, but has
also shocked the sensibilities of many. This article will discuss the
events precipitating the French court's release of Abu Daoud, the
relevant treaties governing the parties' actions, cases dealing with
the law of extradition, and applicable general principles of inter-
national law.
I. FACTS2
On Friday, January 7, 1977, Abu Daoud, militant Pales-
* This article is an expansion of one which appeared in the March 1977 issue of
Commentary.
** Attorney, American Jewish Committee; B.S., Cornell University, 1973; J.D., St.
John's University School of Law, 1976.
1. N.Y. Ass. Res. 49, 200th Sess. (1977). New York's resolution was the most strongly
worded resolution passed concerning Abu Daoud. It was preceded by S. Res. 48, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 81535 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1977), which unanimously con-
demned France's release of Abu Daoud. The House of Representatives passed a resolution
expressing a similar view. H.R. Res. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H377 (daily
ed. Jan. 13, 1977). See also H.R. Res. 112, 114, 125, 147, 193, and 242, which repeat the
sentiment of H.R. 105.
2. The facts were gleaned from a series of articles appearing in the New York Times.
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tinian and Al Fatah leader, was arrested in Paris, where he had
arrived to attend the funeral of a Palestinian activist. Daoud had
entered France using an Iraqi passport and an assumed name.
Officers of the French counterintelligence service, the Directorate
for the Surveillance of the Territory, had made the arrest pur-
suant to an international warrant after they had received perti-
nent information by telephone from the West German police.
West German and Israeli interest in Daoud stems from the
Palestinian's suspected role in planning and taking part in the
massacre of eleven Israeli Olympics sportsmen and six other per-
sons in Munich on September 4, 1972. On January 10, 1977,
Judge Shalsi of the Jerusalem Magistrates Court issued a warrant
for Daoud's arrest. He was accused of murder,3 manslaughter,4
conspiracy to commit a felony,5 abduction,6 causing grievous bod-
ily harm, 7 unlawful wounding,8 wounding and assault in grievous
circumstances,9 aiding and abetting, counselling, and procuring,"0
and conspiring" to commit these crimes under Israel's criminal
code. Accordingly, on the same date, Israel submitted an urgent
request to the French authorities for the provisional detention of
their prisoner pending extradition proceedings. The Federal Re-
public of Germany also submitted a request for extradition,'2 but
it was rejected by France on the grounds that identification of the
prisoner was technically improper, and that German officials had
not formally confirmed the extradition request through diplo-
matic channels.'3
After deliberating for twenty minutes,'4 the French court, the
Chambre d'Accusation, ruled that Israel had no right to demand
detention of Daoud pending extradition since the crimes in ques-
tion had not been committed on Israeli soil, nor by an Israeli
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at Al, col. 1; id. Jan. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 1; id., Jan. 14, 1977,
at Al, col. 4; id., Jan. 16, 1977, at 11, col. 1; id., Jan. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
3. Israeli Criminal Code Ordinance § 214 (1936), Palestine Gazette No. 652, Dec. 14,
1936, at 285 (Supp. 1).
4. Id. § 212.
5. Id. § 33.
6. Id. § 256.
7. Id. § 235.
8. Id. § 238.
9. Id. § 241.
10. Id. § 23.
11. Id. § 24.
12. The request was made pursuant to the terms of the Extradition Treaty, June 28,
1926, France-Germany, 53 L.N.T.S. 435.
13. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at A6, col. 2.
14. Id., Jan. 16, 1977, at 11, col. 1.
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citizen. It further held that the extradition treaty between France
and Israel" was not applicable to the present case because the
terrorist acts had been committed prior to the effective date of
the agreement.
IX. APPLICABLE TREATIES
On November 12, 1958, France and Israel signed an extradi-
tion treaty which entered into force on November 14, 1971.16 Since
that time, under section 11 of the Treaty, Israel has been granting
extradition to France, 7 and it was under this section that Israel
requested the extradition of Daoud. Section 11 required France
to keep the subject, in this case Daoud, in provisional detention
for a period of up to sixty days, pending the formal extradition
request. He was to have been held until Israel could adequately
support its extradition request.
Provisional detention is an infringement upon a suspect's
liberty, but it must be balanced against the irreparable damage
which would result if he were not held at least until the matter
could be examined thoroughly." In February 1973, according to
Israel, Daoud confessed his involvement in the Munich massacre
over Jordanian television.19 Subsequently, both Israel and West
Germany had made known their desire to institute formal extra-
dition proceedings to bring Daoud to justice. In light of these
facts, Daoud was, at the very least, a suspect wanted for a heinous
crime, and holding him pending formal inquiry would not have
been an extraordinary step for the French court to have taken. It
is interesting to note that under French law, entry into the coun-
try under a false name and a foreign passport could have sub-
jected Daoud to eighteen days' detention; this would have been
sufficient time for Israel to begin the formal extradition proce-
dures.20
The French contended that the French-Israeli Treaty did not
enter into force and effect until 1975,21 and since the acts attrib-
15. Extradition Treaty, Nov. 12, 1958, France-Israel, 805 U.N.T.S. 252.
16. Id.
17. Official Statement of Consulate General of Israel, in New York City (Jan. 13,
1977), on file with author.
18. See I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (1971) for a discussion
of provisional arrest.
19. Official Statement of Consulate General of Israel, supra note 17.
20. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at A6, col. 2.
21. At the time of the Munich massacre, French internal law did not authorize the
prosecution within France of foreigners who had committed offenses outside the country.
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uted to Daoud were committed in 1972, the treaty did not apply
to them. In fact, however, the extradition treaty was effective
November 14, 1971, and, as noted above, has been the basis for
extradition to France since that date. The Munich murders were
committed in 1972; even if they had been committed prior to
1971, Article 23 of the treaty specifies that the treaty applies to
crimes committed prior to its entry into force. Such a provision
is valid and does not constitute an ex post facto criminal penalty
since the acts in question were crimes when they were commit-
ted." Only the method of extraditing the suspect was changed by
the extradition treaty.
In the case of the abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argen-
tina in 1960, there was no extradition treaty in force between
Argentina and Israel. When Eichmann was kidnapped from Ar-
gentina and taken to Israel for trial, Argentina correctly claimed
that its territorial sovereignty had been breached. Had Israel and
Argentina signed an extradition pact similar to the French-Israeli
Treaty, Israel would have been hard-pressed to show why it had
by-passed the treaty's mechanisms and had unilaterally taken
the suspect into custody. Even without such a pact, the jurisdic-
tion of Israel to try Eichmann was upheld, and Argentina recog-
nized that no damage was done to its citizens or territory by the
abduction, since Eichmann was an illegal alien.23
A 1975 amendment to France's internal law enlarged the competence of French courts to
try such offenses. It was on this basis that France claimed that it had no jurisdiction over
Abu Daoud until 1975. This was spurious reasoning, however, since Israeli law was a
competent means of bringing the accused to trial, and no reciprocity of signatory nations'
internal statutes was necessary under the French-Israeli extradition treaty. Law No. 75-
624, arts. 11-14, July 11, 1975, [1975] J.O., (1975] J.C.P. M, No. 8, amending C. PR.
PEN., arts. 689, 694, 696.
22. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1965). The general rule is that a treaty
cannot be applied retroactively. Until recently, many writers supported the notion that
ratification of a treaty is retroactive to the date of signature. Since 1930, however, a
majority of commentators have altered their positions, and now accept the rule that the
date of a treaty's operation is the date of ratification. But see Ambatielos Case (Greece v.
United Kingdom), [1952] I.C.J. 28, 40 (retroactive effect given a treaty if there is "any
special clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation").
23. Argentina lodged a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations,
which passed a resolution requesting that Israel make appropriate reparation to Argentina
in accord with the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law. S.C. Res.
138, 15 U.N. SCOR 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). See generally M. PEARLMAN, THE CAPTURE
AND TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN (1963); Q. REYNOLDS, MINISTER OF DEATH: THE ADOLF EicH-
MANN STORY (1960). Argentina, in a joint communique with Israel, later waived its objec-
tions to the kidanpping. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1110 (1968).
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The Eichmann case was complex and was comprised of other
factors bearing on the question of Israel's jurisdiction. 4 But the
the presence or absence of an extradition treaty is an important
element with respect to the Daoud case. Here, the mechanism for
extradition had been established, and had been used by the two
nations in the past. Israel set the process into motion and had
every reason to believe that the Treaty would be adhered to by
France.
III. Case Law
Despite France's disregard of the Treaty, Israel had alterna-
tive grounds for believing that France would extradite Daoud: the
body of international law and custom developed to further the
orderly and peaceful coexistence of sovereign States. If an extra-
dition treaty is in force between the requesting and the asylum
States, the treaty's provisions and mechanisms are examined in
order to ascertain the correct legal manner of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a fugitive. Absent such a treaty, the principles of inter-
national law, as they have evolved in practice and custom among
nations, become operative.Y
At the time of the Eichmann case, the courts of many coun-
tries considered the relevant law to have been articulated by two
United States Supreme Court cases, Ker v. Illinois21 and Frisbie
v. Collins.27 Known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the holdings of
these cases provided that absent an extradition treaty, the man-
ner in which an accused is brought into the court's jurisdiction,
however illegal, in no way affects the competence of the court to
try him.
The decision in Ker v. Illinois concerned a defendant who
had been kidnapped from Peru and forcibly brought to the United
State for trial without resort to the extradition procedures pre-
24. See Fawcett, The Eichman Case, 38 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 181 (1962).
25. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948).
26. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
27. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The importance of these United States cases in international
law derives from the fact that, for eighty years, they were the only cases of the courts of a
major world power which had articulated basic extradition principles. In the Eichmann
case the Israeli court, in determining the issue of jurisdiction over the defendant, relied
upon these cases as the major holdings on the subject at the time. See Silving, In Re
Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1961). For a discussion
of United States practice, see Note, The Status of Political Fugitives and Refugees Under
United States Law, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 266 (1976).
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scribed in a treaty between the United States and Peru. The
United States Supreme Court held that Ker had not been denied
due process since the manner in which he had been brought into
the court's jurisdiction "had no tendency to increase the likeli-
hood of an unfavorable verdict."
Although [the Court] ...recognized the possibility that cases
involving extreme circumstances might justify immunity from
prosecution, the Court felt that such a case had not been pre-
sented. The Court grounded its decision on the overriding public
interest in bringing the guilty to justice, the severe consequence
of a contrary holding, and the availability of both civil and
criminal sanctions against the abductor. 29
Similarly, in Frisbie v. Collins, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to
permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice be-
cause he was brought to trial against his will."3
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine was reconsidered in two recent
cases before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, United States v. Toscanino1 and United States ex rel.
Lujan v. Gengler 2 In the former case, the court took the position
that a defendant's illegal, forcible seizure deprives the court of
jurisdiction if the circumstances surrounding the seizure are so
extreme as to "shock the conscience. 3 3 In the latter case, al-
though the court used the same reasoning as it had in Toscanino,
the facts alleged by the defendant were not found to be suffi-
ciently unconscionable to deprive the court of jurisdiction.
In the Toscanino case, the defendant, an Italian citizen, was
convicted of conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics. He
argued that the proceedings against him were void because the
court had unlawfully acquired personal jurisdiction over him. He
contended that a member of the Uruguayan police force, as a paid
agent of the United States government, had kidnapped him from
his home in Uruguay, that he had then been smuggled to Brazil,
interrogated and tortured for seventeen days, and drugged and
28. Note, International Abduction of Criminal Defendants: Overreaching by the
Long Arm of the Law, 47 U. CoLo. L. Rzv. 489, 490 (1976).
29. Id.
30. 342 U.S. at 522.
31. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
33. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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placed on a New York-bound airplane. The Second Circuit re-
versed the trial court's decision, which had relied on the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine.3 4 The appellate court reasoned, in part, that
such an abduction, if proven, would constitute a violation of the
United Nations Charter3 and the Charter of the Organization of
American States .3 The court stated that the appropriate remedy
would then be dismissal of the charges against the defendant and
his return to Uruguay.37
This retreat from Ker-Frisbie was "severely restricted"3 by
the same court eight months later in Lujan.39 Lujan was an
Argentine citizen and a co-conspirator of Toscanino. Lujan con-
tended that he had been fraudulently induced by a United States
agent to fly from Argentina to Brazil, where Bolivian police, also
paid United States agents, had arrested him. He alleged he had
been held there incommunicado for one week before being placed
on a New York-bound airplane. In finding the court had jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, the Second Circuit held that the reason-
ing in Toscanino did not extend to the facts presented in the
Lujan case" and found no violation of international law.
The theory relied upon in Toscanino was that the Govern-
ment should not be permitted to benefit from its illegal conduct
in abducting the defendant. The Second Circuit, in prohibiting
the exercise of jurisdiction over the unconstitutionally-
apprehended defendant, was, therefore, applying an "exclusion-
ary remedy. 42 Thus, had Abu Daoud been sought by United
34. 500 F.2d at 271.
35. Id. at 278. The United Nations Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state . . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
36. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States declares:
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall
be recognized.
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AmERIcAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S.
No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
37. 500 F.2d at 281.
38. Note, International Abduction of Criminal Defendants: Overreaching by the
Long Arm of the Law, supra note 28, at 494.
39. 510 F.2d 62.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id.
42. Note, International Abduction of Criminal Defendants: Overreaching by the
Long Arm of the Law, supra note 28, at 495.
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States agents, the Toscanino rule would have required that he be
accorded rights under the fourth and fifth amendments of the
United States Constitution to prevent the operation of the exclu-
sionary rule once he had been brought into the United States.43
Israel, however, did not go so far as to allow its agents to seize
Daoud. It has been rumored, although not confirmed, that Israeli
agents informed the French Directorate for the Surveillance of
the Territory of Daoud's whereabouts.4 Even if this were so, the
Israelis chose a "hands-off" policy and favored use of the estab-
lished extradition procedures rather than risk a possible violation
of the rights of the accused.
Although Toscanino's result has been modified by Lujan,
Israel's restraint in requesting Daoud's extradition would have
complied with even the strict Toscanino ruling. It would seem,
therefore, that the French court, by releasing Daoud following a
cursory proceeding, and by denying Israel's legitimate extradition
request, was, in effect, allowing the accused to benefit unjustly
from Israel's adherence to predetermined procedure. Moreover, it
appears that Lujan's reasoning would have justified even an ab-
duction of the offender, assuming there were no extradition agree-
ment, since a court would view such an abduction in light of a
balancing of two policy considerations: the need to bring the
guilty to justice and the need to deter illegal procedures by law
enforcement agents. The Lujan court found the release of the
narcotics dealer to be an unacceptable result; a fortiori, the re-
lease of a suspected murderer should be unacceptable to a reason-
ing court.
The presence and effect of the extradition pact between
France and Israel provide an ordered set of procedures which
would have lent dignity and sobriety to an action against a sus-
pect such as Abu Daoud. In light of this consideration, France
acted unconscionably in failing to hold Daoud pending formal
extradition proceedings. The terrifying implication of France's
failure to administer the law is that in the future, the mechanism
of the law may be by-passed.
43. The court in United States v. Tierney, 448 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1971), for example,
reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule would be appropriate when evidence
was seized in a foreign country by American agents, in order to deter unlawful conduct
by law enforcement officers.
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at A6, col. 4.
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IV. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Assuming, arguendo, that the French-Israeli extradition
treaty was not in effect at the time of the Munich killings, there
are several tenets of international law upon which jurisdiction
may be based when a nation claims the right of extradition.45
Such jurisdiction arises under customary international law and
also, by implication, from the European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism."
One such basis of jurisdiction is the territorial principle. This
theory provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. . . . All ex-
ceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself."47 As a consequence, a State is entitled to punish
any individual who has allegedly committed an offense within the
State's territory." Thus, in the case of Abu Daoud, the territorial
principle would have been the basis for West Germany to claim
jurisdiction and request extradition, had the country's lengthy
extradition procedure been completed in time for the "swift and
unexpected judicial hearing."49
The nationality principle is a theory of criminal jurisdiction
which grants a State the power to try its own citizens or nationals
even when they commit crimes outside that State's territory.
Abu Daoud holds an Iraqi passport, but is generally termed a
Palestinian national. That, no Arab nation claims jurisdiction
over him with respect to prosecution for the Munich massacre is
clearly demonstrated by the fact that the decision of the French
court to release Daoud evoked praise from Arab States. Thus,
this principle would not have conflicted with Israel's extradition
request.
The protective principle permits a State to try criminals,
including aliens, for crimes committed outside that State's terri-
tory, if those crimes were "against the security, territorial integ-
45. See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935), for an authoritative exposition
of this topic [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research].
46. Nov. 10, 1976, art. 2, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1272 (1976).
47. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
48. Harvard Research, supra note 45, at 480.
49. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at Al, col. 1.
50. Harvard Research, supra note 45, at 519.
51. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1977, at A2, col. 5.
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rity, or political independence of the State."" Israel could have
asserted jurisdiction under this principle because Abu Daoud was
acting as a member of the "Black September" Al Fatah terrorist
group, whose existence is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
As such, the Olympics massacre was but a single event aimed at
destroying Israel's security, territorial integrity, and political in-
dependence. The assertion of this jurisdiction "has found agree-
ment in international law because the state exercising such juris-
diction has particularly suffered as a result of the crime: it is the
effect of the crime which confers jurisdiction on the state. '5 3
The passive personality principle also allows a State to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over an alien, if the latter's victim was
a citizen of the requesting State. 4 Under this principle, the Israeli
court, in the Eichmann case, held that Israel had jurisdiction to
try Eichmann, based on the concept of the "quasi-nationality" of
his victimsA 5 This result occurred despite the fact that Eich-
mann's victims, although Jews, were not citizens of Israel since
that country did not exist at the time of the crimes. Thus, this
doctrine should apply even more strongly to the Daoud case
because eleven victims of the Munich Olympics massacre were
Israeli citizens.
Yet another theory of international law can be applied to the
Daoud case. The piracy principle recognizes universal jurisdic-
tion over a "pirate" since he is a common enemy of all mankind:
hostes generis humani.57 Vice-President Walter F. Mondale has
termed terrorists "the new breed of pirates,"58 and the analogy
could indeed be considered valid. This principle forms the basis
of an extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction as it allows enemies
common to all countries to be detained and brought to justice
even by a State which bears no juridictional nexus to the crimi-
nal.
52. Note, International Law: Jurisdiction Over Extra-territorial Crime, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 326, 328 (1961). See also C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1970).
53. C. RHYNE, id.
54. Harvard Research, supra note 45, at 589. See C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRA-
DITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 255-56, 302 n.133 (1974).
55. Silving, supra note 27, at 331.
56. 36 INT'L L. REP. 5 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1968) contains the full text of the district
court and Supreme Court judgments in the Eichmann case. See also Note, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in
International Law, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1087 (1974).
57. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 Am. J.
INT'L L. 739, 759-60 (Supp. 1932).
58. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1976, at 31, col. 1.
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Murder is recognized everywhere as a crime. Although in the
case of Abu Daoud, France's citizens were not his victims; the
murders did not occur on French soil; and Daoud was not a
French citizen, the theory of universal jurisdiction would have
allowed France to acquire jurisdiction over him. The best reason
for universal jurisdiction over hostes generis humani is that they
are a threat to every State, and may be treated as outlaws. 9
At his arraignment in the French court, Abu Daoud's defense
rested upon the absence of a jurisdictional link between Israel,
the requesting State, and the crimes in question." Despite the
existence and international acceptance of the passive personality
and protective principles of criminal jurisdiction, the French
court upheld Daoud's defense and asserted that Israel had no
jurisdiction over Daoud because "the crimes in question had not
been committed on Israeli soil, nor by an Israeli citizen.""1
It is interesting to note that Daoud also stated that since he
had entered France to attend a funeral as a member of the Beirut
Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, he considered him-
self to be immune from extradition as a diplomat during his mis-
sion. This latter point was not ruled upon by the French court;
indeed, it would make a mockery of criminal justice if it were
possible for a perpetrator to cloak himself with diplomatic im-
munity in order to avoid apprehension for past crimes.
59. C. RHYNE, supra note 52, at 109.
60. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, at A6, cols. 1-2.
61. Id. An interesting event, which followed on the heels of the release of Abu Daoud,
places the French court's action in sharp relief against the conventional method of dealing
with a request for the extradition of a criminal. A few days after Daoud's release, Mr. Karl
Sussman, a businessman and naturalized United States citizen of German origin, was
brought before the French Chambre d'Accusation on charges of swindling. An interna-
tional warrant for Sussman's arrest on those charges had been outstanding, at the request
of a Munich court, since August 6, 1975, and Sussman had been detained by the French
since October 23, 1976. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had
supplied information to the French authorities to enable them to hold Sussman, later
sought his extradition.
In proceedings before the Chambre d'Accusation, Sussman's attorney requested his
client's release on the basis of the "Abu Daoud precedent," claiming that the German
authorities had not sent the requisite information to the French court within the pre-
scribed time period, and that there had not been diplomatic confirmation of the extradi-
tion request. The French prosecutor's office answered only that the French government
does not always advise the court when diplomatic confirmation is given for an extradition
request. Sussman was not released. See Letter from the European Director of the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, Paris, to the Foreign Affairs Department of the American Jewish
Committee, National Office, New York (Jan. 14, 1977), on file with author.
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A. Political Offenses
Since the nineteenth century, States have generally refused
to extradite fugitives accused of political offenses. 2 A political
offense has been defined as "an act against the security of the
State." 3 In theory, the reason for the existence of such an exemp-
tion from extradition is that a true political offense is directed
exclusively against the State, and no element whatever of an
ordinary crime is present. For instance, sedition, treason, and
espionage may be viewed as political offenses. On the other hand,
a common crime may be so connected with a political act that
the entire offense is regarded as political, such as the assassina-
tion of a government official, or of a private person during a
political revolt.
In brief what distinguishes the political crime from the common
crime is the fact that the former only affects the political organi-
sation of the state. . . while the latter exclusively affects rights
other than those of the state. . . .The offence does not derive
its politice character from the motive of the offence but from
the nature of the rights it injures. The reasons on which non-
extradition is based do not permit the taking into account of
mere motives for the purpose of attributing to a common crime
the character of a political offence."
The reasoning which argues that an airplane hijacker should
not be allowed to successfully claim exemption from extradition
on the basis that the nature of his crime was "political," may be
applied to the case of Abu Daoud. Commentators have statedo3
that it is irrational to maintain that the political freedom of one
or two individuals, that is, the hijackers, should be held to out-
weigh the risk to the lives of air travelers. So it is at an Olympic
game, where hundreds of thousands of persons convene to watch
62. See generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 333-34 (7th ed. H. Lauter-
pacht 1948); 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 316 (1942). At the time of
the Nuremberg trials, in fact, the accused war criminals sought to classify their offenses
as political in order to escape extradition. S. GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PRosEctIoN
AN PuNIsHMrN 162-70 (1944).
63. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principles of Non-extradition of Political
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or participate in international sports competition. When the
rights of those involved are balanced, it is clear that Abu Daoud's
"political" freedom should carry less weight than the lives of
those persons. Considering the nature of the Munich massacre of
eleven Israeli athletes, it would seem that the horror of the mur-
ders is so overwhelming, from the aspect of common crime, that
any "political" act has ceased to exist.66
B. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
In the past few years, the European community has en-
deavored to deter politically-motivated violence by explicitly ex-
empting certain acts from the category of political offenses. On
November 10, 1976, the Council of Europe adopted the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism."7 Article 1 of the
Convention lists offenses which are not to be considered political
offenses: an attack against the life of an internationally protected
person or diplomat; the kidnapping and taking of hostages, or any
unlawful detention; and complicity in any of the above by any
person. Moreover, Article 2 gives contracting States the right to
recognize as non-political "other serious acts of violence against
persons" claimed by their perpetrators to be politically moti-
vated. Accomplices are again included as offenders.
France was under an international legal obligation to hold
Abu Daoud pending extradition. Absent a decision in favor of the
prisoner's extradition, France was itself bound to try Daoud be-
cause the Convention contains a provision which makes it incum-
bent upon the State which holds the fugitive to charge and try
him if he is not extradited." This provision, an extension of the
principle of universal jurisdiction, is another major aspect of the
Convention, since it carries the policy of the agreement to its
logical end: terrorist acts must be stopped, and a forum for trial
of the accused supplied.
Similarly, in the situation of aircraft hijackings, an earlier
European convention, the Hague Convention of 1970,69 requires
every contracting State to "take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where
66. See C. BAssoumi, supra note 54, at 416.
67. 15 INT'L LEoAL MATS. 1272 (1976).
68. Id. art. 7.
69. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Conven-
tion), Dec. 16, 1970, 12 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
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the alleged offender is present in its territory and [the State]
does not extradite him."" This provision mandating assumption
of jurisdiction has been considered necessary "in order to increase
the possibility of effective punishment, even if the hijacker is not
prosecuted in, or escapes from, the State of landing, or is not
extradited to the State of registration of the aircraft."7'
Sovereign states generally seek to preserve the largest possi-
ble freedom of action in matters vital to their security, and are
usually reluctant to surrender attributes of sovereignty, such as
exclusive jurisdiction over acts committed within their territory.
It is significant, therefore, that by adopting the Hague Conven-
tion and the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Euro-
pean countries are, in effect, stating that the policy against ter-
rorism supersedes the State's need to retain autonomy over crimi-
nal "political" offenders.
Although the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
has not yet been ratified by the adopting countries and therefore
cannot bind any State, its adoption is nevertheless a formal man-
ifestation of the European community's intentions. As such, it
stands beyond custom and closer to statute in persuasiveness.72
Thus, the fact that France was among the countries which
adopted the Convention raises the question, at the very least, of
that country's sincerity and good faith in enforcing the Conven-
tion's provisions in light of Abu Daoud's release.
CONCLUSION
The international community has gone on record as recogniz-
ing the need for certain terrorist offenders to be charged and tried.
The principles discussed above, as well as the existence of inter-
national agreements, provided a substantial basis for the French
court to detain Abu Daoud pending a formal extradition hearing.
Abu Daoud's release by the court was a monumental breach of
France's legal obligations to the sovereign states of Israel and the
Federal Republic of Germany. Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal
Allon stated in the Knesset on January 11, 1977 that France was
70. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
71. McGrane, supra note 64, at 88.
72. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice articulates the four
bases of international law: international conventions, international custom, general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions and teachings of highly
qualified publicists.
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put to an elementary test: that of adhering to its "clear-cut inter-
national obligations" or of committing a "gross violation of its
undertakings for monetary profit." Mr. Allon termed it a test
"between minimal courage and maximum cowardice. '73 It was a
test which France failed.
73. Statement by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon in the Knesset, Consulate General
of Israel, in New York City (Jan. 11, 1977), on file with author.
